SOVIET HISTORY LESSONS

"Collusion with the party elite" — this is how in his book Judgement in Moscow Vladimir Bukovsky describes the 1989 "round table" held by the leaders of the Solidarity trade union and the officials of the Polish Communist Party.

 

Later, in 2013, in Echo of Russia magazine, Bukovsky would elaborate his reasoning: "Let us remember: the regime then managed to negotiate for itself, among other things, two-thirds of seats in the Diet and a presidential post for the duration of the transition period. And, of course, the Polish nomenclature used this transition period to strengthen its positions, to stay afloat (to keep its money, its power, its press) in the new Poland. The "round table" encumbered and pushed back the nation's recovery by an entire generation. As it later became clear from the archives, there was no real need at that time for the opposition to give concessions.

 

Jaruzelski at the time himself was admitting to the people within his circle that if it were not for the "round table," his regime would not have lasted even a few months. What is significant is that in the end – twenty years later – the Poles finally had to put Jaruzelski's comrades in the dock."

 

Bukovsky's article ends with the following verdict: "Of course, it is impossible to foresee all scenarios.

 

We simply need to remember that we are dealing with liars and evil-doers who cannot be trusted, and with whom a compromise is impossible.

 

This point cannot be the subject of bargaining, just like release of political prisoners cannot be the subject of bargaining, just like fair elections cannot be the subject of bargaining, and just like the investigations into the crimes of the regime cannot be the subject of bargaining. This constitutes the indisputable, clearly expressed will of the people, and any concessions on these issues will be quite rightly perceived as betrayal. And while the regime is not ready to surrender, there is nothing to talk to them about. In my view, simple and logical answer to all of these questions had been given a long time ago by Ivan Andreevich Krylov:

 

Your fur is gray, and I am, buddy, silver-haired.

And I have known your wolf-like nature for some time;

So here's my rule:

There's no other way of making peace with wolves,

Than taking their skin right off."

 

Below are excerpts from Bukovsky's book Judgement in Moscow where he analyzes the Polish crisis, the Soviet response to it, and the role of Jaruzelski. To support his analysis, Bukovsky cites relevant documents from the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which he obtained from the Party archives in 1993. 

 

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The question of the likelihood of the Soviet invasion was the key issue in the Polish crisis. The conduct of the leaders of Solidarity, the reaction of the Polish people to the introduction of the martial law, and actions of the West all hung on this issue. It continued to remain the subject of heated debate even after the collapse of the regime and during the "round table" of the leaders of Solidarity with the party elite in the spring of 1989, which determined the current situation in Poland.

 

Even now, when some of the Politburo protocols cited here have already been published in Poland, public opinion is inclined to believe that Jaruzelski was a kind of hero who saved the country from the horrors of Soviet occupation, from bloodshed, from national humiliation, and even from loss of statehood.

 

Even after it became clear that Moscow was not planning any invasion, the Polish people are still inclined to believe that Jaruzelski did not know about it, which means that he was still a hero who subjectively "saved Poland." Needless to say, this is a typical self-justification falsehood, which turned out to be convenient for the majority: both for the former communist leaders, and a huge number of Poles, who in one way or another accepted martial law as a "lesser evil," and even for the former leaders of Solidarity who have thus justified their collusion with the party elite at the "round table".

 

So the "savior of the fatherland," the father of the people, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, continues to live in Warsaw.

 

I don’t know if all the Politburo documents have been published in Poland, but those that I have before me leave no doubt: Moscow was not preparing any invasion, and Jaruzelski knew about it very well. Moreover, not trusting the Polish army too much, by the end of 1981 he himself was repeatedly asking to bring in Soviet troops, but received a decisive refusal from the Kremlin. And he introduced martial law only after becoming certain that he would not receive "military aid" from Moscow.

 

A detailed analysis of the situation in Poland and of the Soviet strategy for it was made by the commission of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as early as April 1981, shortly after a secret meeting in Brest.

 

The internal political crisis in Poland takes on a protracted and chronic character, they wrote. The Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) has largely lost control over the processes taking place in society. At the same time, Solidarity has turned into an organized political force capable of paralyzing the activities of the party and activities of the state bodies, and, in fact, capable of taking power into its own hands. If the opposition has not yet done this, it is primarily out of fear of the incursion of the Soviet troops and because of its hopes of achieving its goals without bloodshed, through creeping counter-revolution.

 

At the same time, it is obvious to everyone that the quiet period which arose after the meeting of the Diet is short-lived. The enemy is doing this for tactical reasons, continuing to accumulate forces to deliver new blows to the party. (...) Solidarity as a whole and its individual links are preparing for the next bout of blackmailing the authorities by putting forward various demands, predominantly of political nature. The signs of stratification that have appeared in the leadership of this trade union do not yet give grounds to expect significant changes in its general orientation. Even if it came to a split between Walesa and the extremists from KOR-KOS, Walesa himself and the Catholic clergy behind him do not intend to lessen the pressure on the PUWP. It cannot be ruled out that extremists may seize control of Solidarity with all the ensuing consequences.

 

Since recently, a new tactical approach has been manifesting with increasing clarity, around which a motley opposition is actually uniting. Realizing that Poland's geopolitical position makes it impossible for it to encroach on the country's participation in the Warsaw Pact and to encroach on the principle of the leading role of the Communist Party, these forces clearly decided to disintegrate the PUWP from within, lead it toward a metamorphosis and thus seize power "on a legal basis." (...) Under these conditions, it becomes necessary to once again examine our attitude to the policy of the Polish leadership and to define more clearly what forces can be relied on in order to ultimately defend the gains of socialism in Poland.

 

On the one hand, "on the right flank" there are "revisionist leaders" who are close to social-democratиц ideas and in fact close to Solidarity. And "on the left flank" there are comrades "closest to our positions" who are mainly old party members.

 

Unfortunately, representatives of this direction do not constitute the majority. One gets the impression that they see a way out of the crisis through a head-on attack on Solidarity, regardless of the current balance of powers. At the same time, they do not see the possibility of improving the situation without the introduction of Soviet troops. This position objectively leads to their ever greater isolation within the party and within the country.

 

The Politburo sees a way out in this situation in the support of Kania and Jaruzelski, who are taking a "centrist position." Although they show "insufficient steadfastness and insufficiently seasoned approach in the struggle against counter-revolutionary forces," and although they are making unjustified concessions to Solidarity and even experience "panic-driven fear of confrontation with it" -- this is the best that we have.

 

Both of them, especially Jaruzelski, have authority in the country. At the moment, in fact, there are no other leaders who could exercise party and state leadership.

 

Therefore, the Politburo decides:

 

To continue to provide political support to Comrades Kania and Jaruzelski, who, despite certain vacillations, are standing in defense of socialism. At the same time, to constantly seek from them more consistent and decisive actions in the interests of overcoming the crisis on the basis of preserving Poland as a socialist country friendly to the Soviet Union.

 

And besides this and other recommendations regarding strengthening the unity of the PUWP and strengthening ties with the working class, economic measures, etc.:

 

Make more active use of the emerging stratification among the leaders of Solidarity, expose the anti-socialist, anti-national activities of KOS-KOR and their leaders, and seek isolation of these counter-revolutionaries. Take decisive measures against attempts to raise a wave of anti-Sovietism in the country.

 

Encourage the Polish leadership to constantly take care of the army and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, their moral and political stability and their readiness to fulfill their duty to defend socialism. (...)

 

Make the most of the factor which holds back counter-revolution, which is tied to fears of internal reaction and international imperialism that the Soviet Union may send its troops to Poland. In foreign policy statements, emphasize our determination, expressed by Comrade Leonid I. Brezhnev at the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, not to leave Poland in trouble.

 

(This document can be viewed by following this link: https://psi.ece.jhu.edu/kaplan1/IRUSS/BUK/GBARC/pdfs/poland/pol81-11.pdf).

 

In short, it is clear that the Soviet threat was a bluff raised to the rank of state policy. In reality, martial law was being prepared from the very beginning, and the entire stake was placed on it (and on a possible split within the Solidarity leadership). Moreover, this decision was never changed, only minor adjustments were made to it. So, by September 1981, it became clear that Kania was not up to his task, despite the direct threats of Brezhnev to fire him. It got to the point that Honecker even offered to gather the leaders of the fraternal parties in Moscow, invite Kania to this gathering and tell him to resign, and replace him with Olszowski. However, even here the Politburo decided not to change its vector: Jaruzelski was appointed. The latter, of course, knew perfectly well why he was appointed First Secretary in addition to the posts of Prime Minister and Defense Minister. Yes, Brezhnev immediately reminded him of this by telephoning him on the day of his "election."

 

L. I. BREZHNEV: Hello, Wojciech.

 

W. JARUZELSKI: Hello, highly-esteemed, dear Leonid Ilyich.

 

Leonid I. BREZHNEV: Dear Wojciech, we have already sent you an official greeting, but I would like to congratulate you personally on your election to the post of the First Secretary of the PUWP Central Committee.

 

You did the right thing by agreeing to such a decision. In PUWP, there is currently no one who would enjoy authority equal to yours. The results of the vote at the plenum speak about this. We understand that you are facing very difficult tasks. But we are convinced that you will master them, that you will do everything to overcome the grave illness that has struck your country.

 

I think that now, it seems to me, the most important thing for you is to choose reliable assistants from among the loyal and staunch communists, to rally them, to set the whole party in motion, to breathe the spirit of struggle into it. This is literally the key to success.

 

And, of course, it is important, without wasting time, to proceed to the decisive actions against the counter-revolution which you have outlined. We hope that now everyone -- both in Poland and abroad -- will feel that things in the country will turn out differently. I wish you good health and success!

 

W. JARUZELSKI: Thank you very much, dear Leonid Ilyich, for your greeting and, above all, for the trust you have shown me. I want to tell you frankly that I agreed to this post with a great internal struggle and only because I knew that you supported me and that you are supporting this decision. If it were not so, I would never agree to it. This is a very difficult, very difficult task in a difficult situation in the country in which I now find myself as Prime Minister and as a Minister of Defense. But I understood that this is correct and necessary, if you personally think so.

 

L. I. BREZHNEV: Wojciech, we have been thinking so for a long time. We have been talking about this with friends for a long time.

 

W. JARUZELSKI: And that's why I agreed. I will do everything, Leonid Ilyich, as a communist and as a soldier, to make things better, to bring about a change in the situation in the country and in our party. I understand and fully agree with you that now one of the decisive moments is the selection of leadership both within the party and in the government. And so I deliberately postponed the decision on the staffing issue until the next plenum, which we will hold in a few days, in order to think well, to consult, to make it a comprehensive solution, and not just a series of individual staffing steps.

 

Leonid I. BREZHNEV: Personnel is very important both in the center and in the periphery.

 

W. JARUZELSKI: It will be necessary to resolve this issue in the peripheries. Of course, this must run in parallel with the strengthening of the party and the spirit of intensification of the struggle. In the right environment, decisive action must be taken to set the tone where there is confidence in success.

 

I'm on my way to a meeting of the Military Council of the Armed Forces at the Ministry of Defense. I will set the appropriate tasks there. We will widely include the army in all areas of the country's life.

 

Yesterday, after the plenum, I had a meeting with the first secretaries of the regional committees and told them not to be offended by the fact that we will involve people from the armed forces in the implementation of certain processes, we will expand meetings of the officer corps with the working class in order to directly influence the workers and isolate them from the influence of Solidarity. Of course, we are not changing our general direction in the sense that we are fighting for the healthy forces within the nation who have made a mistake and have joined Solidarity. We are attracting them to our side and at the same time we will launch into the enemy and, of course, do it in a way that brings results.

 

I am meeting with your ambassador today. I will try to discuss some issues with him in more detail and will ask for your advice on the issues that he will probably report to you.

 

While informing you about all decisions that we make, we will also be inform you what we are guided by when making this or that decision.

 

Now we have the most difficult situation in the market. In this regard, there are many strikes, protests, and there are some that are organized by Solidarity, as well as simply spontaneous ones. This greatly complicates the implementation of the measures that have to be applied. This complicates our work, since the mood in society is not good. But we will try to do everything we can to improve the situation.

 

These are the things I wanted to report to you to start with. Thanks again for the kind words.

 

Leonid I. BREZHNEV: Once again, Wojciech, I wish you good health and success.

 

W. JARUZELSKI: Thank you. Goodbye.

 

(This document can be seen at the following link: https://psi.ece.jhu.edu/kaplan1/IRUSS/BUK/GBARC/pdfs/poland/pol81-5.pdf).

 

Tell me, does this person not understand what is at stake? Everyone understands everything perfectly. And the Politburo is eagerly waiting for the results. Only ten days pass since the appointment of Jaruzelski, and the Kremlin is already nervous about the fact that no progress is noticeable.

 

GROMYKO: I would like to say about Poland, I just had a conversation with Ambassador Comrade Aristov. He said that the one-hour strike was quite impressive. Many enterprises are essentially run by Solidarity. Even those people who want to work cannot work, since the Solidarity extremists block those who want to work, threaten them in every possible way, and so on.

 

As for the plenum, as Comrade Aristov said, it went well, two additional secretaries were elected. At the Diet, which begins its work on October 30, they will raise the issue of limiting the strikes. It is still difficult to say what this law will result in, but in any case, attempts are being made to limit strikes by legal means. Comrade Jaruzelski's speech at the plenum was, I would say, not bad.

 

BREZHNEV: I do not believe that Comrade Jaruzelski is capable of doing something constructive. It seems to me that he is not a brave enough person.

 

ANDROPOV: Jaruzelski hasn't done anything new in essence, although some time has already passed. Barchikovsky and Kubyak are a big hindrance in the Politburo. There was talk and advice was even given such that Barcikowski and Kubiak should be removed from the Politburo. However, Jaruzelski essentially refused to apply such a measure. Moreover, he explains this by the fact that he does not have personnel who could replace these persons.

 

The question of who will be the Prime Minister of Poland is very alarming. Jaruzelski clearly favors Olszewski and Rakowski. Both, of course, are not suitable for the post of a Premiere.

 

BREZHNEV: Schmidt in one of his conversations even let it slip that a very dangerous situation is being created in Poland and that this situation may become more complicated and affect my visit to the FRG, which may not take place.

 

ANDROPOV: Polish leaders are talking about military assistance from fraternal countries. However, we need to firmly adhere to our line -- not to send our troops to Poland.

 

USTINOV: In general, it must be said that our troops cannot be brought into Poland. They, the Poles, are not ready to accept our troops. Now in Poland demobilization of persons who have served their terms [in the army] is underway. Moreover, the demobilized are allowed to go home in order to collect their civilian clothes, and then return again and serve another two months at various jobs. But at this time they are being influenced by Solidarity. Jaruzelski, as we know, organized task forces of about 3 people. But these groups have not done anything yet. Obviously, a meeting with the leadership of Poland, in particular with Jaruzelski, is needed. But who will meet is also a question.

 

RUSAKOV: The Diet will open tomorrow, where the question will stand about granting the government a kind of extraordinary powers in resolving a number of issues. Jaruzelski would really like to come to Moscow. 

 

(This document can be viewed by following this link: https://psi.ece.jhu.edu/kaplan1/IRUSS/BUK/GBARC/pdfs/poland/pol81-5b.pdf).

 

However, Jaruzelski did not manage to come to visit. Brezhnev sent him an "oral message" through the ambassador, which, among other things, said:

 

During many conversations our side has always emphasized one idea: we are not against making agreements. But they should not contain concessions to the opponents of socialism. And most importantly, the matter should not be limited to agreements: along with measures to win over the broad masses of people and various political forces, decisive actions are needed against the open enemies of the national system. You have agreed with this formulation of the issue and yourself spoke of your intention to fight for the working people, and at the same time launch at the class enemy. (...) But now it seems that the stake is being placed only on the first part of this two-pronged formula. We know that you have people in your party leadership who place all their hopes on the continuation of Kania's bankrupt course of action. It would be dangerous to succumb to their persuasion. It is now absolutely clear that it is impossible to save socialism in Poland without decisive struggle against the class enemy. The question, in essence, is not whether there will be a confrontation or not, but who will start it, by what means it will be conducted, and who will have the upper hand.

 

(This document can be viewed by following this link: https://psi.ece.jhu.edu/kaplan1/IRUSS/BUK/GBARC/pdfs/poland/pol81-6b.pdf).

 

As you can see, Soviet troops are not even mentioned. 

 

Finally, on December 10, that is, three days before the introduction of martial law in Poland, the Politburo still does not exactly know what Jaruzelski would do. This is perhaps the most interesting and convincing of the documents.

 

RUSAKOV: The day before yesterday they had a meeting of the secretaries of the provincial committees. As Comrade Aristov reported, the secretaries of the provincial committees did not at all understand the speech of Comrade Jaruzelski, who did not outline a precise course of action. Nobody knows what will happen in the coming days. There was talk about Operation X. At first, it was said that it would be on the night from the 11th to the 12th, then from the 12th to the 13th. And now they say that it will happen around the 20th. It means that the Chairman of the State Council Jabłoński will speak on radio and television and announce the introduction of martial law ... At the same time, Jaruzelski said that the law for the introduction of martial law can be introduced only after it is discussed in the Diet, and the Diet session is scheduled for December 15. Thus, things are getting very complicated. The agenda of the session of the Diet has been made public. It does not include the issue of the introduction of martial law. But in any case, Solidarity is well aware of the fact that the government is going to introduce martial law and, in turn, is taking all the necessary measures to have martial law introduced.

 

Jaruzelski himself says that he intends to address the Polish people. But he will not talk about the party in his address. He will address the people with an emphasis on their patriotic feelings. Jaruzelski speaks of the need to declare a military dictatorship, as was the case under Pilsudski, pointing out that the Polish people will understand this better than anything else.

 

As for such figures as Olszowski, lately he has been speaking more decisively, and it must be said that at a meeting of the Politburo the decision to impose martial law, to take more decisive measures against extremist Solidarity leaders was unanimously adopted, and there were no objections raised Together with Gen Jaruzelski, he intends to contact the allies on this matter. He says that if the Polish forces cannot cope with the resistance of Solidarity, the Polish comrades hope for help from other countries, right up to the introduction of armed forces into Polish territory. At the same time, Jaruzelski refers to the speech of Comrade Kulikov, who allegedly said that military assistance of the USSR and the allied states would be rendered to Poland. However, as far as I know, Comrade Kulikov did not say this directly, he simply repeated the words that Leonid I. Brezhnev who once said that we will not leave Poland in trouble.

 

If we talk about what is happening in the voivodeships, then it must be said frankly that the strength of party organizations is not felt at all there. To some extent, the administrative power is still felt. Essentially all power is in the hands of Solidarity. What Jaruzelski says, he seems to be leading us by the nose, because in his words the correct analysis is not felt. If they do not organize themselves quickly now, of they do not gather and oppose the onslaught of Solidarity, then there will be no success in improving the situation in Poland.

 

ANDROPOV: From conversations with Jaruzelski, it is clear that they do not yet have a firm decision on the introduction of martial law, and, despite the unanimous decision of the Politburo of the PUWP Central Committee on the introduction of martial law, we do not see any concrete measures on the part of the leadership. Extremists from Solidarity are stepping on the throat of the leadership of the People's Republic of Poland. 

 

The church has also expressed its clear position in recent days. It essentially has gone over to the side of Solidarity. Of course, under these conditions, the Polish comrades must quickly prepare for the "X" and carry out this operation. At the same time, Jaruzelski declares that we will resort to Operation X when Solidarity imposes this necessity on us. This is a very disturbing symptom. Moreover, the last meeting of the Politburo of the PUWP Central Committee and the decision taken there on the introduction of martial law testify to the fact that the Politburo is acting more decisively. All members of the Politburo spoke in favor of decisive action. This decision is pressing upon Jaruzelski, and he is now forced to somehow get out of this. Yesterday I spoke with Milewski and asked him what measures are being planned and when. He replied that he did not know about Operation X and the exact date of its implementation. Thus, it turns out that either Jaruzelski is hiding the plan for concrete action from his comrades, or he simply is evading the application of this measure.

 

Now I would like to point out that Jaruzelski is rather persistently putting forward economic demands to us and conditions the implementation of Operation X on our economic assistance and, I would say even more, he raises the question, albeit indirectly, of military assistance.

 

Now if you look at the list of goods requested by the Polish comrades, then, frankly, there are serious doubts about the need to supply these products. For example, what does the supply of fertilizers and some other commodities have to do with the success of Operation X? In this regard, I would like to state that our position, as it was formulated earlier at the last meeting of the Politburo and earlier repeatedly expressed by Leonid Ilyich, is absolutely correct and we must not deviate from it. In other words, we take the position of international aid, we are concerned about the current situation in Poland, but as far as the implementation of Operation X is concerned, it should be entirely the decision of the Polish comrades, whatever they decide, so be it. We will not insist on it and will neither dissuade them.

 

As for economic aid, then, of course, in the amount in which they have requested it, it will be difficult for us to fulfill this. Apparently something should be given to them. But I want to say again that raising the issue of allocating goods as economic aid is impudent, and all this is done with the purpose that if we do not deliver something, they could blame us. If Comrade Kulikov really said something about bringing in the troops, then I think what he said was wrong. We cannot risk it. We do not intend to send troops to Poland. This is the correct position, and we need to adhere to it to the end. I do not know how things develop in Poland, but even if Poland finds itself under the rule of Solidarity, this is one thing. And if capitalist countries pounce on the Soviet Union, and they already have this kind of agreement with various kinds of economic and political sanctions, then it will become very difficult for us. We must look after our country and be concerned with strengthening of the Soviet Union. This is our main vector.

 

In general, it seems to me that our position on the situation in Poland was formulated by Leonid Ilyich in his repeated speeches, in the decisions that have been recorded, and today a very thorough exchange of views is taking place at the Politburo meeting. All this should form the basis of the policy that we must adhere to in our relations with Poland.

 

As for the communications that are being passed from the Soviet Union to the GDR through Poland, we must, of course, do something to protect them.

 

GROMYKO: Today we are discussing the situation in Poland very intensely. Perhaps, never before have we discussed it so intensely. This is due to the fact that now we ourselves do not know in which direction the events in Poland will turn. The Polish leadership itself feels that power is slipping out of its hands. As you know, Kania and Jaruzelski were relying on the neutrals. And now, in essence, there is no such thing, there are no neutrals. The position has been determined quite clearly: Solidarity declared itself as a clear counter-revolutionary organization, claiming power and openly announcing the seizure of power. The Polish leadership must resolve the following issue: either it gives up its positions in case it does not take decisive measures, or to does take decisive measures, introduces martial law, isolates extremists from Solidarity, and puts things in order. There is no other way.

 

What is our attitude toward the Polish events? I completely agree with what the comrades have said here. We can tell the Poles that we view the Polish events with understanding. This is a steadfast formulation, and we have no reason to change it. At the same time, we will have to somehow try to extinguish the mood of Jaruzelski and other Polish leaders regarding the introduction of the troops. There can be no entry of troops into Poland. I think that we can instruct our ambassador to visit Jaruzelski and inform him about this.

 

Despite the rather unanimous decision of the Politburo of the PUWP Central Committee regarding the imposition of martial law, Jaruzelski is now again taking a hesitant stance. At first I was a little encouraged, but now his stance is softening again. Everything remains in force what was once said by him. If they continue to show vacillations in the struggle against counter-revolution, they will have nothing left of socialist Poland. The introduction of martial law, of course, would have informed the counter-revolution in Poland about the firm intentions of the Polish leadership. And if the measures that they intend to carry out are implemented, then, I think, one could expect positive results. (...) I believe that we should not now issue any harsh instructions that would force them to take one action or another. I think that we are to take the correct position here: restoring order in Poland is the business of the Polish United Workers' Party, its Central Committee and Politburo. We have told our Polish friends and will continue telling them about the need to take a firm stance and the need to discourage any slackening. 

 

Of course, if the Poles strike at Solidarity, then the West, in all likelihood, will not give them loans and will not provide any assistance. This is what they mean, and this obviously needs to be taken into account by us. Therefore, Leonid Ilyin's proposal to instruct a group of comrades to look into this issue and, taking into account our capabilities, provide certain economic assistance to Poland, is correct.

 

USTINOV: The situation in Poland is, of course, very bad. The situation is getting more complicated day by day. In the leadership, in the Politburo in particular, there is no firmness, no unity. And all this makes an impact on the state of affairs. Only at the last meeting of the Politburo was the decision on the introduction of martial law adopted unanimously. Now everything rests on Jaruzelski, on how will he be able to implement this decision. But so far no one can speak frankly about Jaruzelski's actions. And we don't know. I had a conversation with Siwicki. He said bluntly that we don't even know what the general thinks. Thus, the person who is now essentially performing the duties of the Minister of Defense of the People's Republic of Poland does not know what will happen next, what actions the Chairman of the Council of Ministers and the Minister will take.

 

As for what Comrade Kulikov has allegedly said about the introduction of troops into Poland, I can say with full responsibility that Kulikov did not say this. He simply repeated what we and what Leonid Ilyich had said -- that we were not going to abandon Poland in trouble. And he knows very well that the Poles themselves asked not to send troops.

 

As for our garrisons in Poland, we are strengthening them. Perhaps I am also inclined to think that the Poles will not go into confrontation, and only, perhaps, when Solidarity takes them by the throat, then they will act.

 

The trouble is, the Polish leaders are not showing determination. As comrades have rightly expressed here, we do not need to impose any of our decisions on them, and we should pursue the policy on which we have agreed. In turn, we too must be ready and not act in a way that has not been shaped by our decisions.

 

SUSLOV: I believe that, as is evident from the statements of the comrades, we all share the same point of view on the situation in Poland. Throughout the entire period of events in Poland, we showed restraint and composure. Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev spoke about this at the Plenum. We spoke about this publicly to the people, and our people supported such a policy of the Communist Party.

 

We have done a lot of work toward peace, and now we cannot change our position. [If we do,] the world's public opinion will not understand us. We have pulled through the UN such large initiatives in order to strengthen peace. We have great results from Leonid Brezhnev's visit to Germany and many other peaceful actions that we have carried out. This made it possible for all peace-loving countries to understand that the Soviet Union firmly and consistently upholds the policy of peace. That is why we must not change our position with regard to Poland, which we have taken from the very beginning of the Polish events. Let the Polish comrades themselves decide what action to take. We should not push them to take any more decisive actions. But we will, as before, tell the Poles that we view their actions with understanding.

 

It seems to me that Jaruzelski is showing some cunning. He wants to fence himself off with requests that he makes of the Soviet Union. Naturally, we are physically unable to fulfill these requests, and Jaruzelski will later say that he had turned to the Soviet Union, asked for help, but did not receive this help.

 

At the same time, the Poles declare directly that they are against the introduction of troops. If the troops are brought in, this will spell disaster. I think we all have a unanimous opinion here that there can be no question of any introduction of troops.

 

As for rendering assistance to Poland, we have provided it with more than a billion rubles. We have recently made a decision to supply 30 thousand tons of meat to Poland, 16 thousand tons have already been delivered. I do not know if we will be able to fully deliver the 30 thousand tons, but in any case, we should, apparently, according to this decision, provide a certain number of tons of meat as aid.

 

GRISHIN: The situation in Poland is proceeding along the path of further deterioration. The line of our Party in relation to the Polish events is absolutely correct. (...) The introduction of troops is out of question. Economic issues will have to be looked into, and what can be given to the Poles.

 

SUSLOV: We need to expose the intrigues of Solidarity and other counter-revolutionary forces in the press.

 

CHERNENKO: I completely agree with what the comrades have said here. Indeed, the line of our party, the Politburo of the Central Committee regarding the Polish events, formulated in the speeches of Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev and in the decisions of the Politburo, is absolutely correct and should not be changed.

 

I believe that today the following decisions should be made:

 

1. Take into consideration the information of Comrade Baibakov.

 

2. In our relations with the People's Republic of Poland, in the future, to proceed from the general political line of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which has been determined in relation to this issue, as well as the instructions of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU of December 8, 1981 and the discussions that took place at the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee on December 10, 1981.

 

3. Instruct Comrades Tnkhonov, Kirilenko, Dolgikh, Arkhipov and Baibakov to continue reviewing issues of economic aid to Poland, taking into account the discussions that took place at the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee.

 

BREZHNEV: What is the opinion of the comrades?

 

ALL: Comrade Chernenko formulated all the proposals very correctly, they must be accepted.

 

The resolution is adopted.

 

(This document can be viewed by following this link: https://psi.ece.jhu.edu/kaplan1/IRUSS/BUK/GBARC/pdfs/poland/pl81-11b.pdf).

 

<...>

 

One doesn't need to explain that over the next five years the situation in Poland got only worse -- the fact which could not go unnoticed in Moscow. Of course, the opposition also got tired: the constant instability and economic difficulties made the entire society weary. However, one could hardly expect the "round table" agreements with the remnants of Solidarity (which, roughly speaking, left two-thirds of political power in the hands of the regime) to stabilize the situation for the long-term future. The "round table" was a mistake: the only thing it did was slow down the Polish society's progress toward democracy.

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Translated from Russian by Alissa Ordabai.