SOVIET HISTORY LESSONS

Vladimir Bukovsky: I was not preparing anything specific to say. The whole meeting was what they call an “ad hoc” meeting which was decided only a few days ago. So I will mostly answer your questions after a very short introduction I will make. 

Now, what happens today with Russia — the conflict and the crisis of Ukraine, is not something unexpected. When the Soviet Union was collapsing, we — I mean the dissidents and the group of people who were opposing communism in Russia — tried to persuade the Russian government to conduct a trial similar to a Nuremberg tribunal. 

It was pretty obvious that the Soviet system was still powerful, despite the fact that the country was collapsing, and it was quite easy to predict that unless we finish them off, they will revive. 

The Soviet system was not defeated, it was bankrupted, and therefore it could revive at any time. That was our line of argument. Like a wounded beast, it had to be finished off, or else it would be back at your throat. We managed to persuade almost everyone in the Russian leadership of that time, except for Yeltsin. 

Unfortunately, nothing could be done without Yeltsin. He was the most powerful man at the end of the Soviet regime. Without his agreement we could not conduct anything. He understood that at the end of such a process, if it were to be started, the Communist Party would be proclaimed a criminal organization and he — a former member of the Politburo — would not be in a position to continue his role in politics. 

Besides, the Western countries, the Western public organizations and governments were putting an enormous pressure on him not to open the archives and not to investigate all the crimes of Communism, because — as I later learned from the documents — they themselves were so much involved with Moscow that such a disclosure would affect their political future too. 

So, as a result of all of our efforts, Yeltsin said, “We shouldn’t rock the boat, our victory is final, they are not coming back,” and all this nonsense. We knew it was nonsense, but we couldn’t do anything with him. 

Unfortunately, we were right, and he was wrong. By 1993 he already retreated, trying to save his own presidency, and very soon he became a hostage of what we call “силовые министерства” — “the power ministries”. 

At the end he had to hand the power to former KGB because otherwise he couldn’t get immunity from prosecution after stepping down. 

And indeed, with emergence of Putin — who was just a nominated by the KGB person — the power was very quickly utilized by the former KGB. Eighty percent of his appointments were from former or acting KGB officers. 

It was bad in itself, because KGB is not a creative organization — all they know is how to repress people, how to harass people, how to stop developments. They are not capable of creating anything new. 

Besides, those who came to power with Putin, during the Soviet times were small-time KGB officers — majors, captains, colonels, who wouldn’t have the whole picture in mind. They knew only what they knew. 

These people didn’t ever understand that the collapse of the Soviet system was inevitable. They would ascribe it to some kind of treason, conspiracies, they did not understand that it would have collapsed anyway. 

So they came to power with a very clear agenda — they wanted to restore the Soviet system. They wanted a revenge, a revanche, a restoration of the system as much as it is possible in modern times. So pretty soon the country felt this turn in politics: the censorship was back, the political repressions were back, and the subversion, and the aggression against the neighboring countries were back too. We have seen provocations in the Baltic countries, particularly in Estonia, we’ve seen a war in Georgia, and, of course, the tension was growing with Ukraine. 

This is not surprising at all. One of Putin’s first statements was that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century. 

Also, unfortunately, the Western weak reaction toward this was back from the Soviet times. (During the Cold War the Western reaction was always very, very weak. Much weaker than it should have been). The West proclaimed Russia to be a democratic country, there was no hostility, they were not enemies anymore, there was cooperation. And no matter how much we tried to warn them that the current regime was not terribly different from the Soviet one, they wouldn’t listen. 

I remember I was in Washington in 2001 and speaking to senators and congressmen, and just before I came, George Bush Jr., the President at that time, made a statement saying that he looked into the eyes of Putin and measured his soul. And I remember saying, “Well, how did he manage to do that? In all my encounters with the KGB officers, soul was one thing I could never spot.”

Unfortunately, that kind of appeasement of the current Russian regime continued. And therefore the reaction to the provocation in the Baltic countries, and in particular the reaction to the aggressive war against Georgia was muted — nothing happened at all. 

Ukraine was always a target for the Kremlin regime. Because without Ukraine back in the Soviet sphere of influence, they would never be able to achieve their goal — the restoration of the Soviet system. 

Besides, I have noticed several years ago that there is a preparation of some provocation in Crimea going on, because Russian authorities would give Russian passports to those living in Crimea very easily. The same as they did in South Ossetia. 

So it was pretty obvious what was going to happen. And we tried to warn everyone. I’ve made several speeches and written some articles. But as you know, before something happens no one pays attention. They always become worried after the fact, not before the fact. 

The current crisis was provoked by Putin himself who pressed Yanukovich to retreat from his plan of some association agreement with Europe, which actually meant nothing. It didn’t commit Ukraine to being pro-European or connect it in a practical or economic sense to Europe. It was just a symbolic thing. 

And yet, even that was regarded by Putin as too much. Yanukovich was called in, there was enormous pressure on him, as well as some carrot — some 15 billion offered to him in order to make a U-turn, and he had to renege his own policy, which provoked indignation of the entire nation. 

The Yanukovich government was already unpopular in Ukraine. It was a corrupt government, everyone knew that. And besides, when the elected president cringes in front of a foreign power, like he did with Putin, it does insult the nation. They didn’t elect their president in order for him to accept orders from a neighboring country. The rest you know from the current news: the Maidan, the revolt, the spread of revolution across Ukraine, and finally — victory for the people of Ukraine, which, of course, was not acceptable for Moscow. 

The fact that they started with Crimea was also predictable. We already knew that they were preparing something in Crimea. Now, what was the purpose of Putin starting this operation? It was not the annexation of Crimea. His purpose was to undo the result of the Maidan. His main operation was supposed to be in Eastern and Southern Ukraine where he hoped to provoke violence, ethnic clashes, which would give him a good pretext to step in and “restore the order,” so to speak. That he failed to achieve. Ukrainians showed enormous restraint and discipline, and even the Russian population of Ukraine en masse proclaimed their loyalty to the Ukrainian state, so the result was not what Putin expected. 

Meanwhile, this hostility has achieved something which Ukraine hasn’t seen in its history — enormous unity of the nation in front of the enemy. We always joke with our Ukrainian friends, that they should erect a monument to Putin who helped the Ukrainian nation to consolidate. So, all in all, we can say that Putin failed to achieve his main objective. At least so far. And the longer it goes, the less likely his success becomes. Because the country consolidates further. The element of surprise has died out. They do expect something like an invasion, therefore it’s a bad time to invade. I think he lost the moment when he could do that. He needed to act very quickly after occupying Crimea. It could have been some success. But the longer he waits, the less chances for success he has. 

We know that there is a concentration of troops on the Ukrainian borders, particularly in the Belgorodskaya district and next to Kharkiv, to Donetsk, and from the North as well. My vision of it is that it is a bluff. It is a pressure he wants to bring on Ukrainians with the hope of swarting the election process. The main target now is not to allow the Ukraine to elect its legal government, the legal president and the parliament, and therefore leave them in a kind of “no-man land.” 

More or less the same scenario used to be in 1981 during the Polish crises. Then the Soviets have concentrated 44 divisions on the Polish borders, while they had no plans of invading. 

I’ve seen the documents of Politburo of that period and I remember they had a special decision which sounded approximately like that: “Since the concentration of the forces on the Polish border cools down the most radical elements of Solidarity, we should continue with this operation.” So my theory is that this is exactly what they are doing right now. Particularly because there is no real army in Russia at the moment. They are in the middle of a reform. They started a military reform, they disbanded many structures, but they didn’t erect new ones. According to a Ministry of Defense report before the Ukrainian crisis, they had only about 10 brigades which were battle-worthy. Having said that, let’s keep in mind that the leadership in Moscow today is, like Mrs. Merkel said, not in touch with reality. What worries me is that they might do something which is not to their best interest which they cannot achieve, simply because they are not realistic. 

And I am absolutely sure that if the Russian army goes into Ukraine now, it will be the end of Putin’s regime. Let’s not forget that about 20 percent of the officers in the Russian army are Ukrainians. Let’s not forget that the conscripts in the Russian army today serve only one year and therefore are not prepared for any battles. 

According to reports of monitoring groups in Russia, they are not provided for well, they are hungry. They are very badly provided for, and therefore are not a fighting force. So my advice to Ukrainians a couple of weeks ago was that the best weapon against the Russian invading army are the old ladies with salo and gorilka who would invite them nicely to come to their home. The army would disappear like water in the desert. And I am pretty sure that Russian generals tell it to Putin, in so many words, that the army is unreliable. But does he listen to anyone? Maybe this guy is so much out of touch with reality that he doesn’t listen to anyone. 

There is an enormous barrage of propaganda right now, particularly on television in Russia, which presents the annexation of Crimea almost like a Russian dream-come-true. It is huge Goebbels-type propaganda. And I am afraid that Putin very easily believes his own propaganda. So my feeling is that if they go, they lose, and the regime will be finished. But question is how many people they will manage to kill before that. At this particular hour they all expect the final decision to be made in the first days fo April. If by April 10 they don’t go into Ukraine, they are most likely not going. 

Meanwhile, the implications of sanctions from the West, which on the surface look very weak, in the long term are going to be quite damaging. It means that in a couple of years Europe will be self-sufficient in natural gas and Russians will lose the market. The economic collapse in Russia in this case is inevitable. Alright, any questions?

Question about the dissident movement and the current opposition in Russia.

When I say “we”, I also mean the old dissidents, people who were still active by the time of 1991. There was still a group of people. Our influence was more moral than political. We would write articles, make speeches, but didn’t have any positions in the government. The Russian government, even in post-communist times, never invited any one of us to any position of influence. At one point, as I was told, I was considered to be Yeltsin’s running mate as Vice President in 1991. [Laughs]. But it didn’t come to it. At another point I was offered to run for Mayor of Moscow, which I turned down. In reality, we have never had any input into Russian politics in official capacity. I simply knew most of these people and I could talk to them, but I had no position to influence them.

As far as more modern times, the Russian opposition is in a bad shape, it’s all split into many small parties. We tried our best to put them together, and we did achieve something. In the year 2010 we managed to organize a movement, a united movement which was called Solidarity, following the Polish example, but it was a long way from Solidarity. Solidarity had ten million members… We achieved something by the year 2011-2012 — the big demonstrations in Moscow which were, actually, organized by this movement. And it come to rather big numbers, something like 130 - 150 thousand people. But it was not enough to topple the government. We were told quite openly by these power ministries that if the number were to reach half a million or a million people in the streets, they would come over to our side, and the Putin regime would be finished. But we never reached that level. 

Now there is the opposite situation. The activity has dropped, so we are now at the lowest turnout. Nevertheless, the threat of the invasion of Ukraine put on the streets something like 15 thousand people, which is not a bad beginning, and I hope it will grow. 

Question about Vladimir Putin’s rule over Russia.

Well, Putin, as far as we know it, is not an autocrat. He has a circle of people with him right from the beginning. About a dozen of people who make the most important decisions. And anyone of them can substitute for Putin, and nothing would change. The question is how to remove the whole bunch of them to break down this regime. And then, whatever the elections will bring, we will have. But that’s not an easy thing. It will require massive action on the part of the people of Russia. And most of them are not very much prepared for that. The problem is that it is pretty easy to immigrate from Russia. There is massive outgoing immigration out of Russia. The population in Russia is dropping every year by almost a million people. That also includes the negative birth rate and things like that, and high mortality. But the bulk of it is the number of people who immigrate. 

Question on whether Vladimir Bukovsky is in touch with the Polish government. 

Not recently, no. A few years back we were in touch with the Kaczyński government, and Jarosław Kaczyński’s position surprised me. He is very quiet, he doesn’t make much out of his brother’s death. We expected him to make a big point in his election campaign, but he never mentioned it in the entire campaign. He didn’t utilize the public sympathy, which everyone expected him to do. 

So, all in all, they are very inactive. And as an opposition to the current government, they are not very effective. I doubt they would contact me, and they know exactly what I would say. There is no need to contact me. I am saying what I should have said to them publicly. So you can read it in newspapers and see it on television. The current government is not going to consult anyone of us because they have a different agenda. They believe they can improve relations with Moscow. And I always laugh and say, “How can you improve relations with the KGB?” It’s very difficult to do because the KGB does not recognize any human relations except for “the enemy” and “the agent.” And unless you become an agent, you are still an enemy. And the more you try to be friends, the more pressure they will put on you. They all know that. 

Question on whether Vladimir Putin had planned the Maidan in Ukraine.

The Maidan was definitely not in the plans of Putin. It was against his plans. And this is what he is trying to do now — to undo the effects of the Maidan. 

With the hanging threat of invasion he is trying to influence the people inside of Ukraine, to influence the forthcoming elections, to get more favorable results from them for Russia, that’s what he is doing. 

That’s why I don’t think he is going to physically attack Ukraine. That moment, I think, has passed. But can he be successful using this kind of intimidation in affecting Ukrainian political development? Yes, he can. 

We look now at the so-called leaders of Ukraine and I am afraid there is none of them who really generates my trust. I look at them at some television programs and that, and I have to learn a bit of Ukrainian these days because there are debates, and I need to see who is who. They are all new people, I didn’t know them before. And none of them seem to be solid. 

There are either people who are already in government and show themselves as corrupt as the others, or there are people who are trying to be demagogical, but not real. 

There are all these threats. The Ukrainians still did not create their own army. Which is amazing. They were given time. Luckily for them, they could have created a serious army by that time. They didn’t, because there is a total mess at the top. Who is the government, why is the government? None of these people really impress me as a good organizer or a solid Ukrainian patriot. They are all suspicious to me. 

I don’t know that is going to happen. And our hope was that Maidan would generate a new generation of leaders. And there are a couple of people who came from Maidan into political life, but only a couple. It’s hardly enough to influence the outcome. Hopefully there will be more and more coming. But at the moment it looks like the leading figure for the elections is Poroshenko. Poroshenko doesn’t impress me as being a solid man. He seems to be a part of the old establishment. Not to mention Timoshenko, who is probably as corrupt as Yanukovich. None of them really excite people or motivate them to go to the elections. 

So bearing in mind this mess at the top, the Russian influence of intimidation could be quite successful. The could maneuver public opinion to electing someone they would accept. And bearing in mind that the entire world wants them to find someone with whom Russia could talk, the pressure on them is unbearable. Look at the European Union. The European Union wants them to improve relations with Russia. That’s in the middle of an occupation! 

The so-called “Baroness Ashton” (we have such a personality) <…> — she is now our Foreign Minister for the European Union, and she said quite openly, publicly, that she wants the Ukrainians to improve relations with Moscow. How come? You can’t improve relations when the enemy army is in your territory. And yet, that’s the objective of Brussels. 

The same happened when they had provocations against Estonia. I went to Estonia to support our friends there. And they told me that the pressure from Brussels is to find some kind of understanding with Moscow.

So instead of being an opposite force supporting these people, Brussels will always pressure them to improve relations with Moscow. 

The same in Poland. Why is the current government of Donald Tusk is so nice to Russia? Because that’s what Brussels wants. It’s not because they love Russians, I don’t think they do. But it’s a pressure. The whole world wants them to be in good relations with Russia. 

And mind you, when the European Union was created, that was the whole idea. There will be the European Union and the Soviet Union. So if someone doesn’t like the Soviet Union, he will go to the European Union, and if someone doesn’t like the European Union, he will go to the Soviet Union. And they will agree between themselves regarding what is the best thing. 

That was openly proclaimed by the architects of the European Union — I’ve seen that in the documents of Politburo. For example, Monsieur Mitterrand, the French President, socialist, he openly said to Gorbachev in 1990 when the Soviet Union was already collapsing, he said, “No, we want a strong Soviet Union, because how otherwise would we control everything between Paris and Moscow?”